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Reframing Regulation:
‘Privatisation’, De-democratisation
and the End of Social Protection?





1 Since 2010, what had previously been New Labour’s approach to business regulation –
‘better  regulation’  (who  could  possibly  object?)  –  has  become turbo-charged  under
conditions of ‘austerity’,  an umbrella term commonly used to capture reductions in
public spending in the UK, legitimised ostensibly as a fiscal and economic response to
the financial  crisis  of  2008/09,  but  which cohered with Conservative party political
commitments to shrinking the welfare state and public services. ‘Better regulation’ has
in effect meant ‘less regulation’: it is a formal policy shift from enforcement to advice, a
concentration of formal enforcement resources away from the majority of businesses
onto so-called high risk areas, and consistent efforts to do more with less.
2 In the context of the onslaught on public services and their regulation, fire protection
has been particularly vulnerable: in December 2018, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary,
Fire and Rescue Services reported that fire safety inspections across England had fallen
by 42% since 2010/11 – a reduction worth bearing in mind in light of the fire at Grenfell
Tower in June 2017 which killed 72 people and devastated the lives of many more.1
Perhaps most alarmingly, a National Audit Office report noted that the government had
“reduced funding most to fire and rescue authorities with the highest levels of need….as defined
by the social and demographic factors.”2 In other words, the cuts to fire and rescue services
have fallen hardest on the poorest – just like all austerity cuts3. 
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3 But this is not simply a sorry tale of anti-regulatory zeal, of austerity and cuts, of the
non-enforcement  of  regulation,  nor  simply  of  the  broader  undermining  of  social
protection.  Rather,  this  is  about  a  process  of  the  long  march  of  profit-seeking
institutions  through  what  was  public  service  and  public  provision  –  a  process
characterised  by  privatisation,  marketisation,  de-democratisation  and  de-regulation
for the business world. Thus, the austerity policies implemented from 2010 onwards are
not simply to be understood as economic necessities nor as opportunities to advance
Conservative social and labour market policies, but are to be understood within this
wider framework of the neoliberal transformation of services of public interest. 
4 In what follows I focus upon the central role that regulatory institutions play in public
provision  in  the  form  of  social  protection  –  protection,  that  is,  for  communities,
workers  and  the  environment  from  the  destructive  effects  of  economic  activity,
ostensibly  achieved  through  regulation  and  its  enforcement.  These  are  relatively
ignored areas of academic scrutiny – a research myopia that has only been accelerated
by the march of neo-liberalism through our institutions, not least academia.4
5 The focus here is upon the effects of both ‘better regulation’ and austerity as political
initiatives,  each fuelled by and furthering neo-liberalism and their effects upon the
capacities  of  regulators  to  undertake  that  with  which  they  are  formally  charged  –
enforcement of law with respect to business. Alongside this, and again in the contexts
of both better regulation and austerity, the article examines how private organisations
are increasingly encroaching upon the public provision of social protection – through
infecting the ethos,  intervening in the practices and formally usurping some of the
roles of public regulators. It is argued that these are processes of de-democratisation.
6 I do so in particular through a focus upon dynamics at local state level, drawing upon
qualitative data gleaned from those at the front-line of local regulatory enforcement –
Environmental Health Officers – a group who have been virtually entirely absent from
social scientific research in general, and not least that focussed on ‘policing’, regulatory
enforcement  and  public  service  provision.  My  geographical  focus  here  is  on
Merseyside, a sprawling but relatively poor conurbation in the North-West of England. 
7 Finally, some of the effects of these processes are examined through a focus upon the
fire  at  Grenfell  Tower,  which  killed  72  residents  in  a  relatively  poor  West  London
housing  estate  in  June  2017.  The  links  between  the  less  visible  decline  of  social
protection documented in this article, their de-democratising effects, and how Grenfell
was politically and socially produced are considered. 
 
Making ‘Better Regulation’
8 In  2004,  New  Labour’s  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  Gordon  Brown  established  the
Hampton Review, with a remit to reduce regulatory “burdens on business” across all (63)
major, national regulators, as well as 468 local authorities.5 It was to be a key moment
in  Labour  shedding  its image  as  an  anti-business,  pro-regulation  party,  instead
embracing  business-sympathetic,  pro-entrepreneurial,  anti  ‘red-tape  policies  which
befit New Labour in government.6 
9 Hampton’s subsequent 2005 report – Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection
and  Enforcement –  proved to  be  the  consolidation  of  ‘Better  Regulation’.  Combining
ideological  attacks  on  regulation  per  se,  undermining  the  role  and  capacity  of
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regulators,  and  engaging  in  pro-business  legal  reform7,  it  produced  significant
reductions in all forms of enforcement activity across a swathe of national and local
forms of regulation.
10 By the General Election of 2010, much in the regulatory landscape across Britain had
been  transformed. Moreover,  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  Election,  the
financial crisis had erupted, resulting in massive bailouts of banks by the state and a
tide of criticism of the level of regulation of the financial sector. Yet, quite remarkably,
the political consensus, at least in Britain, remained that business was over-regulated –
and all three mainstream political parties campaigned on manifestos to further reduce
regulation. The five years of Coalition Government which followed went on to act on
that  commitment  with  a  feverish  intensity.  Nor  did  the  post-2015  Conservative
government relent on its attack on regulation and enforcement – its anti-regulation
practice, if not rhetoric, barely changed in the wake of Grenfell.
11 At national and local levels, then, across a swathe of areas of business regulation, on
virtually  every  indicator  –  be  this  inspections,  all  forms  of  enforcement  action  or
prosecutions – one finds significant and consistent downturns in regulatory activity.
These trends were clearly evident from 2004 onwards,8 and then again as marked, if not
exacerbated, in the post austerity period from 2009/10.9 What we see in these trends in
enforcement data – across environmental protection, fire protection, food standards,
health  and  safety,  minimum  wage,  pollution  control  and  trading  standards  –  is
staggering in that they all follow the same trajectory and, this article argues, are all
effects of the same processes, that is, the effects of the ‘better regulation’ agenda which
began under New Labour, which was pursued further under the Coalition from 2010
onwards, albeit latterly overlain by the effects of austerity. 
 
Austerity, ‘Cuts’ and Local Regulation 
Effect of austerity on local authorities
12 From 2009/2010, local government funding from Westminster came under pressure.
Indeed, it soon became apparent via analyses of the distribution and impacts of these
cuts that they impacted most heavily upon poorer Local Authorities:
Councils covering the 10 most deprived areas of England – measured according to the index
of multiple deprivation – are losing £782 on average per household, while authorities
covering the richest areas are losing just £48 on average. Hart district council in Hampshire,
the least deprived local authority, is losing £28 per household, while in Liverpool District B,
the most deprived area, the figure is £807.10 
13 One of the most deprived regions in the UK is Merseyside – and this section draws upon
a case study of regulation and enforcement in the local authorities which make up this
region. Merseyside is a populous conurbation: the combined population of the five local
authorities11 under examination here is 1.4 million. There are some 40,000 businesses
registered across these authorities.  Merseyside is also one of the poorest regions in
England, if not the poorest. On the Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015), Knowlsey is
the  second  poorest  local  authority  area  in  England,  Liverpool  the  fourth  poorest.
Residents across all five local authorities are particularly reliant upon the local state for
a range of welfare, social and public services, as well as employment opportunities, so
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that changes in any of these impact disproportionately upon local people, as residents,
consumers, and workers.12
14 The focus in the case study is  on three functions of Local Authority Environmental
Health Officers (EHOs) who, through their respective specialisms, enforced law relating
to food safety, which is enforced entirely at local level, and occupational health and
safety  and  pollution  control,  each  of  which  involves  a  division  of  enforcement
responsibilities between local authorities and national agencies (The Health and Safety
Executive and the Environment Agency, respectively).
15 In  a  series  of  interviews  with  35  EHOs  across  Merseyside,13 during  2014-15,  the
strongest,  most consistent theme to emerge focused on ‘the cuts’:  these had clearly
begun to bite, in ways that threatened workers, consumers and communities. Typical
indications were thus: “at present, we can’t meet our statutory duties”; “to be honest we're
now doing statutory stuff only”; “there’s nothing left to cut now”; “there is no padding left,
we’re below the statutory minimum … there are no areas of discretion left”; “where we are now,
we’re at the point where worker safety is being jeopardized”; “it’s going to come to the point
where it’s going to affect the residents, the local population; in many ways we are at that point
now, public health and protection is being eroded”; and, most tellingly perhaps, “we’re at the
point where there is no flesh left, this is starting to get dangerous, a danger to public health”.
There are various dimensions to these cuts and their relationship to wider pressures on
local  authority  enforcement  against  the  private  sector  –  which  are  worth  greater
exploration in the context of this paper. 
 
Staffing
16 Most starkly, staffing levels across each of these three functions across all of the local
authorities had, virtually across the board, been radically reduced. It is worth noting
the absolutely low numbers of staff is at issue here, in any authority in any year, but
notably by the final year for which data is provided, that is, 2017. At its most extreme,
by April 2017, Knowsley had no dedicated pollution control EHOs, and neither Liverpool
nor Sefton had any dedicated health and safety EHOs. It  is little wonder, then, that
during interviews EHOs expressed remarkably similar views, to the effect that local
authority enforcement capacities had been so undermined that public health and safety
was endangered. In terms of EHO staffing in the five Local Authorities, there emerged,
as indicated, a remarkably consistent picture. In every Local Authority, EHO numbers
had  fallen  significantly  between  April  2010 and  April  2015.  Overall,  total  numbers
across the three functions fell by over 52% – from 90.65 Full-Time Equivalents [FTEs] to
47.78 FTEs.  The declines were across all  functions and Authorities,  with health and
safety  EHO numbers  falling  most  starkly;  indeed,  in  two authorities,  Liverpool  and
Sefton, by 2015 there were no dedicated health and safety inspectors –food EHOs said
they would “keep an eye out” for health and safety issues. At the same date, there were
no pollution control EHOs in Knowsley. 
 
Increased Obstacles to Enforcement
17 With fewer staff, it is hardly surprising that many interviewees raised the issues of a
long-term decline in the number and duration of inspections, a long-term decline in
the use of formal enforcement tools, and a decreasing use of prosecution. On the latter,
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another  clear  message  from  the  data  was  of  increasing  obstacles  to  the  ability  to
prosecute. The latter included: a lack of staff time; fear of losing cases, and ‘wasting’
precious  resources  on  them;  lack  of  support  from  Legal  Services  departments  to
prosecute; and an increased political risk (“flak”) in prosecuting. Moreover, these types
of responses are indicative of a political context for regulatory enforcement where the
very idea of regulation is under attack, and are a useful illustration of how discourses
and policies at national level can translate into barriers to enforcement at local levels.
What appear to be quite mundane, technical changes – in budgets, staffing, activities –
are  at  the  same time part  of  a  wider  political  project.  If  ‘better  regulation’  meant
achieving  deregulation,  then  austerity  increased  the  opportunities  for  so  doing
significantly. 
 
A Loss of Expertise
18 Reductions in staff also meant the loss of a particular kind of resource, that is, expertise
and experience: redundancies did not only mean that staff were not replaced but this
also entailed a loss of specialist expertise, alongside pressures for regulators to become
generalists. As one respondent put it, “it’s the experienced staff who have gone, so we have
lost  numbers  and  expertise”.  In  fact,  the  shift  from  regulators  being  specialists  to
generalists was one consistent theme across the interviews, referred to by numerous
respondents and in every authority: “People have had to become generalists”; “most of them
are just thankful they’ve still got a job”. 
19 Of course, such dynamics of broader ranges of competence being expected from staff in
the contexts of organizational pressures (external and internal) is not confined to this
context  –  indeed,  it  would  be  familiar  to  the  readers  of  this  journal  who  work  in
education  or  academia,  where  teachers  are  increasingly  expected  to  be  generalists
across subjects, actively researching and generating income, engaged in impactful work
and  public  engagements,  and  undertaking  a  range  of  administrative  tasks,  whilst
performing pastoral and an increasing range of non-teaching but student facing roles.
 
A Lack of Training
20 Moreover,  the  loss  of  staff  combined  with  a  shift  from  a  specialist  to  generalist
inspection focus  had made re-training  necessary.  However,  another  clear  theme to
emerge from the interviews was of  declining opportunities for training at  the time
when it  was most  needed.  As  one Regulatory Services  manager  put  it  ,  “We have  a
training budget, but it is now business hardened” – by which he meant that there was “little
access” to training, “except to free online courses”. An EHO translated this into the effects
on an individual: “I used to go on 6 to 10 courses a year, now perhaps one or two, I’m supposed
to  do  10  hours  of  CPD  [Continuous Professional  Development]  a  year  but  am  struggling  to
manage that”. 
 
The Reach of the Private Sector into Public Service
21 Alongside the resource constraints within which Local  Authorities are struggling to
meet  their  statutory  duties  as  regulators  is  a  related  development  –  the  creeping
influence of the private sector in those regulatory efforts. Here we find clear instances
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of austerity as a key vehicle for further neo-liberalism – and, in their combination,
austerity and neo-liberalism are changing the role of local regulation and enforcement,
perhaps irrevocably. This not only undermines the idea that regulation is something
which is aimed at controlling business,  but it  also creates an increasing democratic




22 We can see the creeping influence of the private sector in changes to the education of
EHOs. Such education is crucial not simply for its formal substance but for the ethos
and priorities of the profession which are shaped through it. 
23 EHOs attain professional status through a University degree course accredited by the
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health (CIEH). In 2011, the curriculum was over-
hauled, partly, in the words of one interviewee, a programme leader of one such course
at a North West University, to reflect “the shift in the profession from not being seen as
inspection  focused”.  In  the  words  of  another  respondent,  a  student  EHO,  “CIEH  is
increasingly making the content of degrees more private-sector friendly”. This process had
already begun as a result of Local Authorities’ inability to offer paid placements for
students, while students require placements in order to complete the main assessment
on their degree course. Several respondents said that local authority-funded students
simply no longer exist – the one student EHO of the panel was working in the authority
part-time, unpaid. More commonly, since students still have to undertake a placement,
they now take these where they can be paid, or at least receive expenses, that is, in the
private sector – Asda, Sainsbury’s, Tesco’s were all mentioned as significant sites for
such placements in the food sector. This also means that the values and perspectives of
the private sector (the regulated) are prioritised for the student EHO over those of the




24 When respondents were asked where they thought their service might be in five to ten
years, responses were a variation on a theme, encapsulated pithily by the response, “I
don’t know if I’ll be here in one year let alone five years”. Those who expanded upon this
rather  dis-spirited  response  indicated that  the  function would  become increasingly
subject  to  market  forces  and  logics,  with  reforms  taken  towards  partial  (through
outsourcing) or full privatisation, the latter being the wholesale ownership of functions
by private companies. Such observations were couched in the context of more general
prognoses of how local authorities would respond to the pressures of funding cuts14.
25 Such indications are hardly pure speculation. The wholesale outsourcing of regulatory
functions – contracting these out to private contractors in a prefiguration of wider
privatisation  –  has  been  realised  in  two  local  authorities.  In  October  2012,  North
Tyneside Council announced the transfer of 800 employees to Balfour Beatty and Capita
Symonds.  Then, in a much bigger contract,  in August 2013,  the London Borough of
Barnet saw off a legal challenge to a contract to hand over its services to two wings of
Capita, under what has become known as the ‘One Barnet’ model. Business services –
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estates,  finance,  payroll,  human  resources,  IT,  procurement,  revenues  and  benefits
administration, and customer and support services – have been outsourced to Capita in
a  ten-year  contract  worth £350m.  A  range of  other  services  –  including regulatory
services – were contracted to its subsidiary Capita Symonds, in a £130m contract, also
for ten years. From January 2016, Burnley Council’s environmental health services were
outsourced to Liberata.
26 These wholesale shifts from public to private provision are the mere visible tip of a
significant iceberg. Councils in Bromley, Chester West, Cheshire, and Wandsworth have
all publicly considered wholesale privatisation of regulatory services. Moreover, recent
research by the New Economics Foundation for the Trade Union Congress calculated
that, “Environmental and regulatory services is the sector with the second biggest proportion of
expenditure paid to external contractors, at 44 per cent”,15 second only to social care. The
arrangements  under  which  this  outsourcing  proceeds  are  complex  and  opaque,
confounding accountability and often even transparency under clauses of ‘commercial
confidentiality’, and include diverse arrangements such as the use of Strategic Service
Partnerships (SSPs), Joint Venture Companies (JVCs), shared services, and collaborative
outsourcing.16
 
The Primary Authority scheme
27 The transformation of social protection within the broader context of the neo-liberal
transformation of welfare states is not simply about non-enforcement – it also involves
a concerted effort to change the relationship between the state, the private sector and
regulation. Indeed, this changing relationship is increasingly one in which the private
business, ostensibly the object of regulation, becomes a key vehicle in that regulation. A
paradigmatic instance of this is being achieved through the Primary Authority scheme,
itself illustrative of how the economics and politics of Better Regulation have combined
to  produce  a  fundamental  shift  in  the  practice  and  principles  of  regulation  and
enforcement.  The  Primary  Authority  (PA)  scheme  was  introduced  by  the  Labour
Government in 2009, but given considerable impetus by the Coalition Government from
2010,  notably  following  the  establishment  of  the  Better  Regulation  Delivery  Office
(BRDO) in 2012, for which oversight of the scheme was a key priority.
28 According to the BRDO, the scheme;
allows businesses to be involved in their own regulation. It enables them to form a statutory
partnership with one local authority,  which then provides robust and reliable advice for
other  councils  to  take  into  account  when  carrying  out  inspections  or  addressing  non-
compliance. The general aim is to ensure that local regulation is consistent at a national
level, but sufficiently flexible to address local circumstances. The business can decide what
level of support it requires, and the resourcing of partnerships is a matter for the parties
concerned. A primary authority can recover its costs.17 
29 When this  statement  was issued,  in  April  2014,  1500 businesses  had established PA
relationships across 120 local authorities. The PA scheme has mushroomed in recent
years. By 27 March, 2017 there were 17,358 such relationships across 182 authorities. In
a  prelude  to  The  Enterprise  Act 2017,  the  Government  stated  that  “ The  number  of
businesses in Primary Authority is expected to increase from 17,000 to an estimated 250,000 by
2020 and simplification of the administrative arrangements for the scheme is required to support
this expansion”.18 PA schemes apply across a vast swathe of areas of regulation, but their
main  areas  are  pollution  control,  occupational  health  and  safety  and  other  local
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environmental health enforcement areas, such as food safety, trading standards, fire
safety,  licensing,  petrol  storage  certification  and  explosives  licensing.  It  allows  a
company –  and,  since  April  2014,  franchises  and businesses  in  trade  associations  –
operating across more than one local authority area to enter an agreement with one
specific local authority to regulate all of its sites, nationally. So, a supermarket brand
like Tesco’s may have stores in every one of the local authorities in England and Wales
and,  under  the  PA scheme,  it  can  reach an  agreement  with  one  local  authority  to
regulate its systems across all of its stores in every local authority for complying with a
relevant body of law – occupational health and safety or food hygiene, for example.
This  guarantees  a  homogeneity  of  regulatory  treatment  –  often,  a  homogeneity  of
regulatory acceptance and tolerance – across geographical areas.
30 To regulate its systems, the company makes a payment to the local authority, agreed
through contract.  It  should be immediately clear that this  structure through which
contracts are agreed enormously favours the businesses – these are few as opposed to
the many local authorities who want the contract and the associated economic benefit
from the business, so that such highly unequal terms of trade should be thought of as a
distorted market of few sellers and many buyers.
31 Aside  from  the  power  to  impose  more  rather  than  less  favourable  contractual
conditions, the key benefit of the Primary Authority agreement per se for the company
is the absence of effective oversight in the vast majority of its sites. These can be visited
in other areas, but any enforcement action needs to be undertaken through the local
authority which is the PA. Should a local authority wish to prosecute a company in a PA
agreement, for example, it can only do so with the permission of the local authority
which is  party  to  that  agreement.  Then,  under  the scheme,  any consideration of  a
potential  prosecution  must  entail  prior  notice  being  given  to  the  company;  the
company can then request that the matter be referred to the Better Regulation Delivery
Office (BRDO) for determination.19
32 The Government’s directives to local authorities leave no doubt that the scheme is a
way for enforcement action against business to be reduced:
Primary authorities generally report low levels of enforcement action against the businesses
they partner with. In the event that an enforcement officer decides to take action against a
business that is in a direct partnership with you, or covered by a co-ordinated partnership
with  you,  he  or  she  is  required  to  notify  you  via  the  Primary  Authority  Register.  As  a
primary authority you can direct against (block) an enforcement action being taken against
the business when you have issued relevant Primary Authority Advice and the business was
following it.20
33 While civil servants at the Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO) stated21 that the PA
scheme is “a big success”, it is proving highly problematic for local regulators, even as
they sought to enter into PA agreements in order to generate income – “this is why we
are really pushing the PA scheme”, one local authority interviewee told me. But as another
respondent put it, while “in theory it could work well, in practice it protects large companies
from local authority enforcement”. Others noted similar problems with the scheme, for
example:  “under PA they [companies]  only  have to  demonstrate  the existence of  systems”,
referring  to paper-based  plans  and  methods  rather  than  actual  practices;  Local
Authorities have a “disincentive to take enforcement action because PA schemes are a source
of income”; PA schemes “protect companies from inspection and enforcement”; they operate
“in my experience at the level of a tick-box [exercise] rather than real co-operation or taking
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responsibility”;  PA schemes “work on  paper  only,  there  are  hundreds  of  businesses  in  the
scheme and I can’t see how these can all be genuine”.
34 In general,  then, as one enforcement officer noted, “Primary Authority has had a real
impact on what we can and cannot do”; the claim was made at length that businesses “pick
and  choose”  which  local  authorities  to  enter  into  PA  agreements  with,  with  the
insistence  that  they  will  pick  the  “no-one  knows  anything  authority”,  that  is,  local
authorities with no experience of the particular industry or business. Moreover, in the
processes of negotiation to draw up the contract which represents the PA agreement,
local authorities are at a distinct disadvantage – there is an asymmetry of expertise22
between  local  authority  negotiators  and  private  companies  in  such  contractual
negotiations, as well, of course, as a structural power accruing to private companies
operating across numerous authorities to drive down the terms of contract with any
one local authority.
35 The Primary Authority scheme, then, represents a fundamental shift in the nature of
local regulation and enforcement. It is a classic vehicle of ‘Better Regulation’, since it
reduces inspection, builds in checks against regulation and enforcement, exacerbates
the power imbalance between regulators and regulated, and operates on a marketised,
contract-based system. It is crucially indicated in the demise of social protection – a
demise gruesomely illustrated by the fire at Grenfell Tower which came at the end of
the period of research discussed in this paper, and which horrifically illustrated many
of the themes generated through that research.
 
The Grenfell tragedy: from lack of regulation to loss of
lives
Grenfell and the Shield of Primary Authority
36 Understandably, the fire at Grenfell generated a torrent of media, public and political
attention.  But  within  this  torrent  of  24-hour,  7-days-a-week,  52-weeks-a-year
comment, the role of Whirlpool and certainly of its Primary Authority, Peterborough
City Council Trading Standards, received what ranged from little to no scrutiny. 
37 Within days of the fire, with the national and local state still absent from the scene, as
controversy around the numbers of lives lost raged, and as mounting evidence of the
public  and  private  cost-cutting  involved  in  the  fatal  refurbishment  of  the  Tower
spewed into  the  public  domain,  the  Metropolitan police  (the  Met)  stated that  they
suspected the immediate cause of the fire to be a Hotpoint fridge freezer. As part of
their  press  release  in  response  to  this,  the  manufacturers  of  the  Hotpoint  brand,
Whirlpool, stated that,
We are working with the authorities to obtain access to the appliance so that we
can  assist  with  the  ongoing  investigations.  Under  these  circumstances,  we  are
unable to speculate on further details  at  this  time.  We are addressing this  as  a
matter of utmost urgency and assisting the authorities in any way we can. We will
provide additional  updates  as  our  investigations  progress.  The government said
that  consumers  do  not  need  to  switch  off  their  fridge  freezer  pending  further
investigation.23
38 It is of interest that neither that brand name nor the manufacturer have featured very
much at all in the mass of coverage around the fire and its aftermath. 
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39 It  is  also  worth noting that  the  consumers’  organisation Which?  and the  Chartered
Institute for Trading Standards (CTSI) had been campaigning for several years for a ban
on plastic-backed electrical  goods.  Whirlpool and other manufacturers had opposed
this. In this opposition, Whirlpool had been consistently supported by Peterborough
Trading Standards – on which more, below. 
40 When the Phase 1 report from the Public Inquiry was published, some 28 months after
it  occurred,  Sir  Martin  Moore-Bick,  the  Chairman  of  the  Grenfell  Tower  Inquiry,
concluded that,  “Although  some  questions  remain  unanswered,  the  evidence,  viewed  as  a
whole, leaves me in no doubt that the fire originated in the large fridge-freezer”.24 Wherever
the truth lies – and on balance it seems that the fridge freezer was the trigger for the
atrocity – there is a backstory to the fridge freezer and Whirlpool: one of corporate
power, regulatory failure and the victimisation of consumers. 
41 In  August  2016  –  ten  months  before  the  Grenfell  Tower  fire  –  that  latter  fire  was
chillingly foretold in a relatively unreported event. In a tower block in Shepherds Bush
Green, West London, just over a mile from Grenfell, a fire caused the 18-story tower
block  to  be  evacuated.  No-one  was  injured  but  images  of  the  tower  block  burning
closely resemble those of Grenfell.25 Moreover, the cause of the fire was found to be a
faulty tumble drier, the Hotpoint brand made by Whirlpool. In fact, having acquired
Indesit (and thus all of its brands, including Hotpoint) in 2014, Whirlpool began a series
of appliance testing which identified faults in three brands of tumble driers, namely
Hotpoint,  Indesit  and  Creda,  whereby  a  build-up  of  fluff  could  lead  to  fires26.
Parliamentary hearings later revealed that the problems with some Whirlpool driers
had first come to light in 2005, and the Chartered Trading Standards Institute believed
they should have been recalled by 200627. In November 2015, Whirlpool estimated about
3.8m  tumble  dryers  were  affected  by  the  fire  risk.  Owners  were  told  to  contact
Whirlpool for a repair, a response supported by Peterborough Trading Standards, its
regulator under the Primary Authority scheme. Despite some political and consumer
group pressures, it perfectly legally resisted calls for a product recall. Owners were told
they could use the dryers, but should be in attendance whilst in use, and not to use the
timer button. In fact, it was only in February 2017, following intense pressure from the
London Fire Brigade, that Whirlpool advised its customers to unplug and not to use the
dryers. 
42 In September 2017, an inquest found that a fire in a flat which killed two men in Conwy
county in October 2014 was most likely caused by a fault in a Whirlpool tumble dryer.
The coroner concluded, “On the balance of probabilities, the fire was caused by an electrical
fault in the tumble dryer in the laundry room of the flat”. The one occupant who survived
said the dryer had been switched off at the time of the fire.28
43 Alongside this emerging evidence of the hazards associated with some of its tumble
dryers,  Whirlpool  were  also  more  broadly  associated  with  safety  problems with  its
white goods in the UK. In November 2017,  the London Fire Brigade responded to a
Freedom of Information request revealing that white goods had triggered 2,891 fires in
houses, flats and public settings such as care homes and nurseries, from January 2009
to September 2017.  These had led to  10  deaths and 348 injuries.  Brands under the
Whirlpool umbrella accounted for 895 fires – the highest of any manufacturer.29
44 Such data helps to explain the establishment, in 2017, of a House of Commons cross-
party committee on The Safety of Electrical Goods in the UK, which produced its report in
early 2018. Aspects of the hearing were astonishing, and the report itself damning. On
Reframing Regulation: ‘Privatisation’, De-democratisation and the End of Soci...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-2 | 2021
10
the issue of Whirlpool’s dangerous tumble driers in particular, the Select Committee’s
Report found that there were 5.3m driers affected and that only about half had been
repaired. 
45 The report also noted that cuts to local government budgets had affected local Trading
Standards’ abilities to deliver consumer protection services, so that 
[b]etween 2009 and 2016 total spending on local Trading Standards fell from £213m
to  £123m…  This  has  led  to  a  reduction  by  56%  of  full-time  equivalent  Trading
Standards staff between 2009 and 2016.30 
46 It further questioned “the independence of… Primary Authority partnerships... because they
provide both advice to local businesses whilst also ensuring enforcement”,31 noting that it was 
shocked to hear that Whirlpool and Peterborough Trading Standards continued to
advise consumers they could use defective appliances, even after a major fire and in
the face of criticism from consumer safety organisations. The advice to consumers
to  attend appliances  while  in  operation  was  unrealistic  and –  given that  a  fire
occurred when this advice was followed – patently inadequate.32
47 This latter relationship – between Whirlpool and Peterborough Trading Standards – is
one of the crucial aspects of this whole episode. 
48 The broader fallout from Grenfell therefore illustrated that it was in effect the shield of
Peterborough  Trading  Standards,  through  their  contractual  Primary  Authority
agreement, which allowed Whirlpool to continue to refuse to recall products they knew
were  not  fit  for  purpose  and  indeed  posed  a  proven safety  risk,  which  had  led  to
fatalities. Regulation, ostensibly in existence to protect consumers, residents, workers
and so on, is being transformed into a form of state-corporate collusion by contract
which protects the private sector from law enforcement. 
 
“We’re dying in there because we don’t count”
49 So spoke one teenage resident on the morning of 14 June 2017 as he stood outside the
still burning shell of Grenfell.33
50 Both the  fire  and the  ‘not  counting’  are  partly  the  outcomes  of  the  economic  and
political  initiatives  outlined  in  this  paper.  Once  regulation  is  viewed  as  hindering
business, and thereby economic growth, whilst at the same time a drain on already
stretched state  resources,  then the momentum against  regulation is  accelerated.  In
some areas such as those at issue in this paper, much less visible and of lower profile
than,  say,  financial  and  market  regulation,  the  tendency  to  see  regulation  as
interference  becomes  virtually  unstoppable  –  and  once  less  state  regulation  and
enforcement is to be preferred, then how little is little enough?
51 As has also been indicated in this paper, the rationale for regulation has shifted under
‘Better  Regulation’  –  from  one  ostensibly  aimed  at  delivering  some  level  of  social
protection to one whereby regulation is vehicle for private growth and profitability,
where regulators promote and protect the interests of economic actors. At local levels,
this shift has been stark, with local authorities increasingly servicing private business
rather than providing public service, and even with public provision being replaced
wholesale by private regulation of private capital. In other words, what is at issue here
is not just reducing, but changing the shape and nature of local government even if any
focus on local responsibilities for social protection is often absent from even critical
analyses of this process.34
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52 The  trends  at  issue  in  thus  paper,  therefore,  also  amount  to  a  process  of  de-
democratisation. It is in this context of de-democratisation that Tenants’ Management
Organisations (TMOs), like the Kensington and Chelsea TMO, need to be understood.
Tenants’ Management Organisations were allowed in UK law from mid-1994, ostensibly
to allow residents in council housing or housing associations to assume responsibility
for  their  management.  In  fact,  in  breaking the  management  and financing of  local
housing  from  the  local  authority,  for  some  commentators  a  TMO  came  to  be  best
understood as an arms-length organisational arrangement within local neo-liberalism
which breaks formal lines of accountability and undermines democracy.35 And this is
also  the  context  within  which  we  better  understand  both  the  conditions  in  which
residents of Grenfell Tower and the Lancaster West Estate within which it sits lived and,
most crucially, their relationships with the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
(RBKC)  Council  and  the  Kensington  and  Chelsea  TMO  to  which  the  Council  had
transferred  the  management  of  the  borough’s  entire  council  housing  stock,  9,700
homes, in 1996.36
53 Stanning has argued that KCTMO was universally hated by those it housed across the
Borough, a hatred which “goes beyond the usual suspicion of residents towards those
who have power over them. KCTMO has for years been an unaccountable and deeply
resented part of life for many Kensington and Chelsea residents”.37 This relationship is
best characterised as one of contempt by the KCTMO for Grenfell residents,38 nowhere
better captured than in the refurbishment of the Tower which was ultimately to prove
fatal for at least 72 of its residents – and the disastrous decision to clad the Tower
“because it was an eyesore for the rich people who live opposite”.39 Such relationships
typify wider processes of gentrification and social cleansing in many of the UK’s inner
cities, but most notably in London.
54 Formed  in  2010,  the  Grenfell  Action  Group  (GAG)  joined  with  Unite  Community
Membership  –  formed  by  the  trade  union  Unite  to  extend  membership  and
organisation beyond workplaces – from 2015 principally as a result of concerns about
the  refurbishment  of  the  tower  block40.  In  this  context,  the  Group  documented
“threatening  and  intimidatory  tactics”  being  used  by  the  TMO  and  Rydon,  the  lead
contractor in the Tower’s refurbishment, to get access to flats – access which had been
denied in response to what GAG saw as sub-standard and dangerous work. The Group
set out a long list of residents’ “primary concerns with regards TMO/Rydon”, at the top of
which was the “(l)ack of meaningful consultation with residents and feeling of total disregard
for tenant and leaseholders’ well-being”.41 Safety concerns relating to the lack of fire safety
instructions, power surges, the single staircase egress in the event of a fire and the
exposure of gas pipes within the flats as a result of the refurbishment were commonly
expressed. 
55 The starkest of these warnings had been published in November 2016, under the soon-
to-be-proven prescience of  a  headline  which read KCTMO –  Playing  with  fire!,  which
included the following passage:
It  is  a  truly terrifying thought but  the Grenfell  Action Group firmly believe that  only a
catastrophic event will expose the ineptitude and incompetence of our landlord, the KCTMO,
and  bring  an  end  to  the  dangerous  living  conditions  and  neglect  of  health  and  safety
legislation that they inflict upon their tenants and leaseholders. .. [O]nly an incident that
results in serious loss of life of KCTMO residents will allow the external scrutiny to occur that
will  shine a  light  on the practices  that  characterise  the malign governance of  this  non-
functioning organisation…42
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56 Such chillingly prescient words were ignored, as virtually all of the claims, warnings,
concerns of local residents were ignored by a Council who not only did not represent
them but  would  have  preferred to  have  them out  of  the  borough,  allowing luxury
developments for the world’s super-rich to expand north-westwards. This is almost de-
democratisation  in  action  –  the  GAG  was  attempting  to  reinject  democracy  into  a
context  where  it  was  absent,  and  even  such  stark  whistle-blowing  was  denied
legitimacy. While it was the fire which caused loss and devastation of lives, it was in
many respects a class-contempt which was the cause of this outrage – a contempt that
continued in the wake of the fire through the initial absence of the national and local
state, and then through the lies, broken promises, and half-truths which characterised
the response of state actors and bodies when they did eventually arrive on the scene.43
 
Conclusion
57 Social protection is a complex project, and one which, in Britain at least, has a very
long history, dating back to the 1830s.44 For most democratic states, it is also a key
source  of  legitimacy.  As  this  paper  has  indicated,  however,  it  can  be  quickly
undermined, if not dismantled. The combination of an undermining of the culture of,
resources for and practices which constitute public regulation and enforcement have at
the  same  time  been  intimately  linked  with  a  creeping  involvement  of  private
businesses in regulating private business – a process which is at best beset by potential
conflicts of interest, at worst disastrous. This combination of trajectories cannot be said
to have caused Grenfell of course – the atrocity has a much deeper and wider aetiology.
But if contextual, and hardly proximate, they are a crucial part of its economic and
social production.
58 Grenfell illustrates better than anything that the processes outlined in this paper do
not  amount  to  a  story  about  rules,  regulations  or  red  tape.  Nor  is  it  about  the
juxtaposition of public versus private.  Rather, this is  a story about social harm and
social  inequality  –  lives  lost  and  shortened,  the  health  of  communities,  workers,
consumers  made poorer.  It  is  a  story  about  processes  of  de-democratisation,  being
heard, and an “accountability vacuum”.45 It is a story about the concentration of wealth
and power and the insatiable desire for more of each. It is a story about contempt for
those who, in the eyes of the powerful and the rich, simply ‘don’t count’. It is a story
about the intentional removal of social protection – and thus a story about avoidable
business-generated, state facilitated violence: what Engels called over 150 years ago,
“social murder”46.
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ABSTRACTS
This  paper  considers  how the re-framing of  regulation,  in  ways  that  have allowed an inter-
penetration of private sector mentalities and actors with state regulators, have combined in the
UK to produce both a de-democratisation and the erosion of social protection. It does so through
an exploration of the enforcement of law designed to regulate business. In particular, I examine
enforcement  and  regulatory  policy  at  Local  Authority  level  under  the  guise  of  the  Better
Regulation  initiative  and,  then,  conditions  of  austerity.  These  contexts  have  produced  the
opportunities  for  reframed  –  that  is,  specifically,  marketised  –  forms  of  regulation  which
prioritise the interests of business over social protection. The paper also argues that they have
been  crucial  in  producing  conditions  whereby  the  fire  at  Grenfell  Tower  must  be  partly
understood – conditions of de-democratisation and the decline of social protection.
Cet article examine comment la réforme de la régulation au Royaume-Uni, dans le sens d’une
interpénétration entre, d’une part, les mentalités et acteurs du secteur privé, et, d’autre part, les
acteurs publics de la régulation, a produit un déficit démocratique et une dégradation en matière
de protection sociale. L’article se concentre sur l’application de la législation destinée à réguler
les activités commerciales, et en particulier sur l’application de cette législation et les politiques
de régulation à l’échelle des collectivités locales dans le double contexte du programme baptisé
Better  Regulation,  puis  des  mesures  d’austérité  budgétaire.  Ce  double  contexte  a  favorisé  des
formes de régulation réformées – plus précisément marchandisées – qui font primer les intérêts
marchands  sur  la  protection  sociale.  Cet  article  montre  également  que  ces  éléments  ont
contribué à produire les conditions dans lesquelles l’incendie de la Tour Grenfell a eu lieu et qu’il
doit au moins partiellement être analysé à l’aune d’un déficit démocratique et du déclin de la
protection sociale. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: déficit démocratique, application des lois, Grenfell, collectivités locales, secteur
privé, politiques publiques, régulation
Keywords: de-democratisation, enforcement, Grenfell, Primary Authority, private companies,
public authorities, regulation
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